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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
"In the law of taxation it is frequently reiterated that 'statutes
are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. If the words are doubtful, the
doubt must be resolved most strongly against the Government and in favor of the citizen.' 34 Where the statute, however, contains no ambiguity it must be taken literally and given
effect according to its language. 85 But the expounding of a
statutory provision strictly according to the letter without
regard to the other part of the act and legislative history,
would often defeat the object intended to be accomplished." 3 6
IRVING WEINSTEIN.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL

IMMUNITY FROM

TAXATION.-The prob-

lem of intergovernmental immunity from taxation is constantly assuming a more important place in the law of taxation.' With mounting
deficits in national and state budgets due to tremendous relief expenditures, new sources of income must be found. To meet this
need, governments have undertaken new fields of activity, such as
liquor selling,2 furnishing electric power 3 and the running of railroads. 4 With both Federal and State Governments engaging in
these activities 'the question naturally arises, will each or either be
immune from taxation by the other? The answer lies, if anywhere,
in the decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject.
The roots of the problem are in the famous decision of Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland 5 decided in 1819 on
purely political grounds. 6 The rule established, there being no express provision in the Constitution, 7 was that a state could not tax
the business and functions of the Bank of the United States, chartered by the Federal Government. The keynote of the decision was
"' Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 153, 38 Sup. Ct. 53, 55 (1917) ; United

States v. Merriam, 263 U. S. 179, 188, 44 Sup. Ct. 69, 71 (1923) ; Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 348, 49 Sup. Ct. 123, 125 (1929) ; Tyler v.
United States, 281 U. S. 497, 503, 50 Sup. Ct. 356 (1933) ; Note (1931) 6 ST.
JOHN'S

L. REv. 172, and cases cited therein.

Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1, 37, 15 Sup. Ct. 508
(1895) ; Commissioner of Immigration v. Gottleib, 265 U. S. 310, 313, 44 Sup.
Ct. 528 (1924).
INote (1934) 9 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 222.
1Note
(1934) 44 YALE L. J. 326.
2
FosDICK AND Scorr, TOWARD LIQUOR CONTROL (1933).
3
THomPSON, PUBLIC OWNERSHIP (1925) 20, 204.
' Supra note 3.
'4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
04 BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1919) 302.
'Supra note 5.
'Bates
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the supremacy 3 of the Federal Government over the states. The
federal supremacy theory 9 which was upheld in subsequent decisions 1o received a rude setback by a decision 11 a half a century
later, which although not directly overruling the McCulloch case,
had that practical effect, by holding that State and Federal Governbeing sovereign there was rements were on a par and that each
2
ciprocal immunity from taxation.'
The Day case 13 became a rallying ground for all types of exemptions 14 and in a great number of instances the exemption from
a particular tax was claimed not by the state as such but by some
private interest. 15 The rule of the Day case had been so often af-6
firmed and so firmly intrenched in the law by judicial decision 1
'In the language of Judge Marshall, "The difference is that which always
exists, and always must exist between the action of a whole on a part, and
the action of a part on the whole-between the laws of a government declared
to be supreme, and those of a government which, when in opposition to those
laws is not supreme."
. Boudin, Taxatim of Governmental Instrumentalities (1933) 22 GEo.
L. J. 6.; U. S. CoNsT. Art. VI, §2.
This case held
"'Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827).
unconstitutional a Maryland statute taxing foreign imports (citing McCulloch
v. Maryland, supra note 5, as authority); Weston v. City of Charleston, 2
Here a state tax on federal securities was held
Pet. 448 (U. S. 1829).
The
unconstitutional; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869).
power of federal government to tax a state bank was upheld but a strong
dissent by Judge Nelson became the basis for the majority decision in the later
case of Collector v. Day, infra note 11.
' Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1871). Here the salary of a
state judge was held not subject to a federal income tax.
' Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by Taxing Power
of States (1919) 32 HARv. L. Rav. 902. Prof. Powell expressed the opini6n
that the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity is economically unsound.
"Supra note 11.
"'United States v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 17 Wall. 322 (U. S. 1873) ; Mercantile National Bank v. Major, 121 U. S. 138, 7 Sup. Ct. 826 (1887); Gillespie
v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171 (1922), held unconstitutional an
income tax on a lessee of Indian lands owned by the United States; Metcalf
v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172 (1926), in which an engineer
claimed exemption as an independent contractor with the state, the income
being derived as a result of the contract; Panhandle Oil v. Mississippi, 277
U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451 (1928) ; Burnett v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285
U. S. 393, 52 Sup. Ct. 443 (1932). •
"United States v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., supra note 14; Manhattan v. Blake,
148 U. S. 412, 13 Sup. Ct. 640 (1893); Indian Motorcycle v. United States,
283 U. S. 570, 51 Sup. Ct. 601 (1931); Willcutts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 51
Sup. Ct. 125 (1931). In the Indian Motorcycle case, at 580, Justice Stone, in
his dissenting opinion, said: "The implied immunity of one government either
national or state from taxation by the other should not be enlarged. Immunity
of the one necessarily involves curtailment of the other's sovereign power to
tax. The practical effect of enlargement is commonly to relieve individuals
from a tax at the expense of the government imposing it without substantial
benefits to the government for whose theoretical advantage the immunity
is invoked."
"Supra notes 14 and 15.
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1 7
that possibilities of overruling it became remote, if not impossible.
Despite this fact there has been a marked tendency on the part of

the courts

18

and in contemplated legislation "- toward limiting its

application.
In a recent decision, Powers v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,20 the Supreme Court held taxable under the Federal Income
Tax Law, the salary of a trustee of a municipally owned railroad,
the trustee having been appointed by the legislature of the state of
Massachusetts and receiving the salary as an officer of the state.
To support its decision the Court relied on the case of South Carolina v. United States,21 in which officers of a state liquor dispensary
were held liable to a general license tax of the Federal Government.
This was the ruling despite a holding three years earlier by the
Supreme Court in Ambrosini v. U. S.,22 that a federal stamp tax
on a bond furnished by a liquor dealer to the state was unconstitutional. These two latter cases, though factually different, should
be governed by the same principle. 23 The South Carolina case how25
ever, for the first time 24 placed a direct limitation on the Day case,
by setting up a proprietary governmental test to the activity, and
confining the state to the latter; and since a state engaged in the
liquor business is not exercising a strict governmental function 26
it is not entitled to immunity. In applying this test to the Powers
case, Chief Justice Hughes in the course of his opinion, pointed out
that the running of a railroad is not the exercise of a governmental
function 27 and since the railroad itself is not exempt from federal
taxation 28 it would be illogical to hold that its ,employees, though
: S. J.RE.s. 251, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. A proposed constitutional amendment
was introduced into the Senate in 1933 for the purpose of amending the
Constitution in order to do away with tax-exempt government bonds.
' South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct. 110 (1905);
Flint v. Stone Tracy, 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1911) ; State of North
Dakota v. Olson, 33 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); Ohio v. Helvering, 292
U. S.360, 54 Sup. Ct. 725 (1934) ; Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U. S.514, 46 Sup.
Ct. 172 (1926); Willcutts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 51 Sup. Ct. 125 (1931);
Susquehanna Power Co. v. Tax Commission, 283 U. S.291, 51 Sup. Ct. 434
(1931).
"Si ,ipra note 17.
21293 U. S. -, 55 Sup. Ct. 171 (1934).
" Supra note 18.
' Ambrosini v. United States, 187 U. S.1, 23 Sup. Ct. 1 (1902).
' Boudin, Ta2ation of Governmental Instrumentalities, supra note 9, at

276.

2 The term "governmental" had previously been used as a limitation, but
had never fully been applied until the South Carolina case. See United States
v. Baltimore, supra note 14; Ambrosini v. United States, supra note 22.
' Supra note 11.
I Note (1933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 322. It was herein stated a state engaged
in the liquor business is exercising a governmental function.
- Flint v. Stone Tracy, snpra note 18.
28 The fear that federal taxation might be undermined if the states could
engage in various businesses is well expressed by Judge Brewer in South
Carolina v. United States, supra note 18, at 455, "Obviously if the power of
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state officers, were exempt. The lower court 29 on the strength of
dicta in .aprior case 30 had held, disregarding the rule in the Carolina
case,3 1 that no government officer's salary was subject to taxation.32
The literal application of the Day case 3 3 justified the circuit court's
interpretation. Yet even conceding the rule as laid down in the
South Carolina case, it would still be possible and plausibly so, to
distinguish the Powers case 34 on the ground that the trustees were
regulating public utility rates and were to apportion deficits to be
secured by taxation by the state.3 5
Since the Carolina case 36 was decided, however, the tendency
has been to narrow the field of state exemption,3 7 at least where the
proprietary-governmental standard is applicable.3 8 The Powers
case 3 9 seems to emphasize this, and since it is the latest decision of
the Supreme Court in interpreting the doctrine of intergovernmental
immunity, it becomes important in determining the future attitude
the state is carried to the extent suggested and with it is relief from all federal
taxation the national government would be largely crippled in its revenues.
Indeed, if all the states should concur in exercising their powers to the full
extent, it would be almost impossible for the nation to collect any revenues."
68 F. (2d) 634 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
Metcalf v. Mitchell, supra note 18; see also Frey v. Woodworth, 2 F.
(2d) 725 (E. D. Mich. 1924). Here salary of an employee of a municipally
owned railroad was exempt from taxation.
nuSupra note 18.
" Metcalf v. Mitchell, .apra note 18, at 524, "Any taxation by one government of the salary of an officer of the other is prohibited." Also, Commissioner v. Ogden, 62 F. (2d) 334 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932), in which the same
circuit court that decided the Powers case granted immunity to the fees paid
an auditor appointed by a state court on the theory that he was a judicial
officer. Denman v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 73 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
The court in this case held taxable the income of a manager of a city-owned
water works, expressly disproving the decision of the Circuit Court in the
Powers case.
'Supra note 11.
ISupra note 20. See G. C. M. 13745 (1934) XIII, 41, 7064. Here it was
held that a state engaged in the liquor business is ordinarily subject to a
federal tax, but was immune in this case because the profits of the business
were to be used for relief purposes, which is the exercise of a governmental
function. In view of the Powers case the ruling is incorrect.
'Note (1934) 47 HARV.L. Rxv. 1212.
"'Supra note 18.
' Trinity Farm v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466, 54 Sup. Ct. 469 (1934) ; Metcalf
& Eddy v. Mitchell, Willcutts v. Bunn, both supra note 18.
' Flint v. Stone Tracy, supra note 18. The Supreme Court here refused
to exempt public service corporations operating a railroad under state franchise
from the operation of the internal revenue laws.
Ohio v. Helvering, supra note 18. State civil service employees of state
liquor monopoly not exempt from federal income tax. Counsel opposed to the
tax, without avail, attempted to distinguish the case from the South Carolina
case on the ground that in the Ohio case state civil service employees were
being taxed.
State of North Dakota v. Olson, 33 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929),
appeal dismissed, lack of jurisdiction, 280 U. S. 528, 50 Sup. Ct 151 (1929),
holding a state-owned banking corporation subject to federal capital stock tax.
"Supra note 20.
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of the court. Will the court extend the doctrine of the South Carolina case 40 to apply to federal projects such as the T. V. A.41 permitting the state to tax those that are not strictly governmental 42
or will it assert the admitted supremacy of the Federal Government? 43 Indications are that further limitations of the rule in the
Day case 44 are not only possible but in view of the present attitude
of the court as expressed in the Powers case, are likely.
ALOYSIUS W.

GLENNON.

'0Supra note 18.
"' Tennessee Valley Authority Act, P. L. No. 17, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1933), 16 U. S. C. A. Supp. §831 (1933).
" Note (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 326. There is no justification in precedent
for such an extension.
'Supra note 9.
"Supra note 11.

